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The ‘Stability Pact’ agreed at the Dublin Summit in December 1996 and 
concluded at the Amsterdam European Council in June 1997 prescribes 
sanctions for countries that breach the Maastricht deficit ceiling in stage three 
of European Monetary Union. This paper explores possible motivations for the 
Stability Pact as an incentive device for fiscal discipline and as a partial 
substitute for policy coordination and a common ‘stability culture’.
JEL classification-. F33, F36, F42, E58, E61























































































































































































The Dublin Summit of 13-14 December 1996 endorsed an outline for a 
“Stability and Growth Pact” to become effective in Stage Three of Economic 
and Monetary Union (EMU). Subsequently, the legal details of the Pact have 
been worked out based on proposals by the Commission and the discussions of 
the Ecofin meeting in Noordwijk on 4-6 April 1997. Despite intitial calls for a 
comprehensive renegotiation of the Stability Pact by the new socialist 
government after the second round of French parliamentary elections on June 1, 
the Pact has now been concluded as planned at the Amsterdam Summit on 16 
June 1997. However, as a concession to French demands a separate “Resolution 
on Growth and Employment” was adopted alongside the European Council 
Resolution on the Stability and Growth Pact. A new Title on Employment is 
also to be included in the Amsterdam Treaty (“Maastricht II”) scheduled to be 
signed in October 1997.
Based on the proposal by the German finance minister, Theo Waigel, first 
launched in November 1995, the principal purpose of the Stability Pact is to 
enforce fiscal discipline inside EMU by strengthening, clarifying and speeding- 
up the ‘excessive deficit procedure’ of the Maastricht Treaty; and by building in 
quasi-automatic sanctions to penalize countries found in excessive deficit. The 
Stability Pact can be viewed as a self- and pre-commitment device attempting to 
limit discretion in the application of the excessive deficit procedure.
The central features of the Stability Pact provisions regarding the decision 
procedures, the timing and the size of sanctions and their impact on 
policymakers’ behaviour will be examined in Section Four of this paper. In 
order to form a balanced judgement on the usefulness (or otherwise) of the 
Stability Pact, the first step is to try to understand the rationale behind it. 
Reactions to the Maastricht fiscal criteria, both as an entry condition for EMU 
and as a permanent constraint to be enforced by the Stability Pact inside stage 
three of EMU, can be classified into three main groups. The first group is 
concerned about the costs of restricting the flexibility of fiscal policy, the 
second - on the contrary - welcomes the discipline the criteria impose on 
policymakers. Both arguments together give rise to a (familiar) debate over the 
relative virtues of rules versus discretion (or credibility versus flexibility), here 
applied to fiscal policy. Both camps are interested in the operation of fiscal 
policy per se and EMU is only relevant to the extent that it affects the costs and 
benefits of fiscal flexibility or discipline. While most of the debate has been 
dominated by the first two groups, the main inspiration for the fiscal criteria 
really has been quite a different one, namely to aid the European Central Bank 



























































































* riTSPT *  ■"«-
Stability Pact and its implications for fiscal policy (in section two) the more 
important task in section three is to try to understand how fiscal restrictions 
might affect the conduct of monetary policy.
The three different views on the Stability Pact can easily be traced to the 
respective theoretical frameworks used to assess the role of the fiscal criteria. 
From the perspective of traditional (Keynesian) macroeconomics and the theory 
of optimum currency areas restricting fiscal policy, the only remaining national 
policy instrument in a monetary union, can become very costly. This line of 
argument has led to the prevalently critical attitude towards the Maastricht 
fiscal provisions in the economics profession. Arguments in favour of deficit 
and debt ceilings are usually drawn from political economy or public choice 
approaches that identify a deficit bias in political decision making processes. In 
this perspective the Maastricht provisions are useful to help achieve a reduction 
in deficits and debt desirable in its own right and independently of EMU. Such 
a view tends to be shared by economists who are sceptical of the role and 
efficiency of fiscal policy interventions and by those interested in reducing the 
role of the state in the economy more generally. Besides drawing on the debate 
over rules versus discretion the discussion of the Maastricht fiscal provisions 
can also be approached from the perspective of the literature on international 
policy coordination. If there are fiscal policy spillovers across countries and in a 
common capital market, deficit ceilings might be seen as a rule-based partial 
substitute for fiscal policy coordination inside EMU.
None of the above purely fiscal arguments adequately reflects the primary 
purpose of the Maastricht criteria and the Stability Pact. In the words of the 
president of the European Monetary Institute Alexandre Lamfalussy (1997) the 
Maastricht provisions help countries to “exercise concerted discipline in the 
conduct of their fiscal management... to minimise the risk of an adverse policy 
mix and an excessive burden on monetary policy”. Any attempt to capture the 
motivation for the Stability Pact and the Maastricht fiscal criteria must therefore 
focus on the interaction of fiscal and monetary policy. The premise here is that 
central bank independence alone is not sufficient for the credibility of monetary 
policy but requires the support of a generalized “stability culture” (Winkler 
1996) and of fiscal discipline in particular. Furthermore, the crucial problem of 
policy coordination arises between (national and aggregate European) fiscal 





























































































II. The Stability Pact and Fiscal Policy
Constraints on fiscal policy, such as the deficit ceiling of the Stability Pact, can 
be useful if in their absence deficits would tend to be excessive from the 
national or the international (here: European) point of view. In the first case 
inefficiency arises from domestic deficit biases, in the second case from policy 
spillovers across different countries. In both cases the benefits of commitment 
to rules or deficit ceilings must be weighed against the potential losses from 
reduced flexibility of fiscal policy in stabilizing economic shocks.
a) Countering domestic deficit bias
There are several possible stories to tell here. The simplest one, put forward 
most forcefully by public choice theorists (Buchanan 1977, Olson 1965), draws 
on the observation that special interests pushing for public expenditure 
programmes are generally well-organized, unlike taxpayers. Moreover, future 
taxpayers are not represented at all in the democratic process, which favours the 
build-up of public debt to be repaid by future generations and may also lead 
politicians to ignore the negative long-run growth effects of deficits via the 
crowding out of productive private investment. Government instability and a 
host of other political and institutional factors can be used to explain why the 
public finance performance of political systems has differed widely across 
countries (Alesina and Perotti 1995, Roubini and Sachs 1989, Grilli et al. 1991, 
Corsetti and Roubini 1993). The fact remains that the last two decades have 
produced a debt build-up in European countries, unprecedented in peace-time, 
where fiscal policies in several countries have become unsustainable, in 
particular in view of demographic trends and unfunded pay-as-you-go pension 
systems (Masson 1996). This suggests that neither the political process nor the 
discipline of financial markets appears to be sufficient to induce governments 
always to take heed of the long-run budget constraints.
Furthermore, even if neither governments nor voters or interest groups suffered 
from myopia but all agreed on the need to reduce deficits and debts, this 
remains a difficult goal to achieve. Each group will try to minimize its own 
contribution to deficit reduction, whose benefits have public good 
characteristics for all of society and future generations. The Maastricht 3% 
deficit ceiling backed up with an external enforcement mechanism can then be 
seen as a blunt device to impose an upper limit on the domestic deficit bias, 
which - depending on the stock of initial debt and the assumptions on nominal 
growth rates - may (or may not) suffice to guarantee a sustainable budget 
position. In this context the 3% deficit criterion is internally consistent with the 




























































































5% nominal growth. Clearly more sophisticated rules could be derived from 
public finance considerations (Buiter et al. 1993). Equally clearly it would be 
preferable to address the (political) distortion of budget policy at source, if 
possible, instead of imposing arbitrary numbers. However, the Maastricht 
criteria are best understood as a simple commitment device in a second best 
world of incomplete contracts.
The fact remains that the Maastricht criteria have been welcomed by many 
policymakers as an external commitment device to enhance the domestic 
consolidation of public finances that was seen as necessary independently of 
EMU. However, it is not clear why countries could not have adopted unilateral 
self-commitment, e.g. in analogy to the constitutional balanced budget 
amendment long in discussion in the United States and in widespread use at the 
state level, or reformed their budget processes. Unless international multilateral 
commitment is more credible than unilateral reforms the inclusion of the fiscal 
criteria in the Maastricht Treaty must derive from a fear that monetary union 
could increase the domestic deficit bias or render its effects more damaging.
The effects of monetary union and a single capital market on the incentives for 
fiscal policymakers can go in both directions. On the one hand the long-run 
budget constraint facing governments is hardened to the extent that the 
Maastricht Treaty’s “No-bail out clause” is credible and monetary financing of 
government debt by the European Central Bank is ruled out (Glick and 
Hutchison 1993). On the other hand, access to financing will be easier in the 
unified European capital market and (presumably) cheaper for high debt and 
deficit countries no longer suffering national interest rate premia for 
devaluation and inflation risk. Abolishing national currencies removes the 
disciplining effect of international currency markets on national fiscal policies 
(Thygesen 1996), even though bond markets may be expected to correctly price 
the remaining default risk (again if the “No-bail out clause” is perceived as 
credible).
There are two main arguments against the need to impose additional fiscal 
constraints in monetary unions. One holds that bond markets price default risk 
correctly and that this would act as an adequate deterrent. The second line is to 
argue, on the contrary, that with sufficient taxing powers and control of the tax 
base countries will always be able to service their debt and there is little to 
worry about (Eichengreen and von Hagen 1996). From this the probability of 
default should be very small for sovereign states with sufficient taxing powers 
(i.e. as long as tax bases are not too mobile) and large stocks of assets, even if 
the recourse to the printing press is ruled out. Therefore default premia are 




























































































Moreover, market reactions and political crises in response to fiscal problems 
tend to be discontinuous, i.e. provoke a sudden and abrupt withdrawal of 
confidence which is difficult and costly to deal with ex post and thus may 
render an explicit or implicit bail-out inevitable. This will at least be the case if 
financial market instability threatens to spill-over and affect partner countries or 
the common monetary policy, as discussed below. For these reasons it remains 
doubtful that market discipline is effective, let alone efficient, in offsetting a 
domestic political deficit bias. Even if the No-bail-out clause were credible, 
there are additional conditions for market discipline to be effective such as the 
timely availability of information and, most importantly, that borrowers must 
respond to market signals (Lane 1993).
Empirically, the fact remains that governments have been seen to follow 
irresponsible budget policies in a wide variety of exchange rate regimes and in 
spite of market discipline. Therefore fiscal constraints can make sense in order 
to offset domestic deficit biases. Moreover, most federal states have restrictions 
on borrowing at the state-level (Masson 1996), even if introduced for different 
reasons as argued by Eichengreen and von Hagen (1996), or they form a 
Political Union with sufficient power to dissuade deviant behaviour. The 
additional case for fiscal restrictions under Monetary Union and in the absence 
of Political Union then rests on the presence of (EMU-specific) fiscal policy 
spillovers across participating countries.
b) Coordinating fiscal policies
From a standard Mundell-Flemming model we know that the effectiveness of 
fiscal policy is enhanced in a fixed exchange rate regime such as monetary 
union (Agell et al. 1996), because expansionary effects on output are no longer 
countered by an exchange rate appreciation, except via the common external 
exchange rate. The effect on foreign output, however, is ambiguous since the 
stimulation via greater import demand may be offset by the dampening effect 
from higher interest rates (Eichengreen 1997). Under open global (and 
European) capital markets the effect on interest rates should be very small, 
however. Still, net spillovers are ambiguous, in principle, and not likely to be 
very sizeable, even though with increased economic integration the size of 
fiscal leakages increases and therefore the a priori case for coordinated policy 
responses to shocks (Masson 1996).
The second aspect of fiscal spillovers concerns the crowding out of investment 
from deficits raising the common interest rate in an integrated (European) 
capital market. Indeed one justification for formulating the criterion in terms of 




























































































“expression of the burden on financial markets” (Thygesen 1996) as the 
relevant spillover. However, a member state will only give rise to an externality 
if it runs a current account deficit, i.e. if the sum of national investment and the 
deficit exceeds national savings (Pisani-Ferry 1996). Again, to the extent that 
world capital markets are integrated the effect from any individual EMU 
member country on the common real interest rate should be small. Yet, as 
discussed in the next section the conduct of fiscal policy, both deficits and debt, 
may affect both the short-run and the long-run credibility of the common 
monetary policy and thereby nominal interest rates, inflation expectations and 
actual inflation.
A third externality arises from effects on the common external exchange rate, 
which should appreciate in response to fiscal expansion and rising interest rates, 
crowding out partner countries’ net exports. A fourth possible channel of fiscal 
spillovers has already been mentioned in the context of the “No-bail out 
clause”. This channel arises if an increase in default risk in a member country or 
a subsequent financial crisis cannot be confined to the country in question but 
leads to expectations of an explicit or implicit bail-out or a systemic financial 
crisis across the common capital market.
Most of the spillovers of fiscal policies are not directly related to monetary 
union per se but rather rest on the degree of trade or financial market integration 
(Eichengreen and von Hagen 1996). Moreover the issue of active policy 
coordination, addressed only scarcely by the Maastricht Treaty in Art. 103 that 
regards economic policy as “of common interest”, needs to be distinguished 
from the problem of a systematic deficit bias that might be addressed by 
imposing constraints on deficits. In the latter case the deficit ceiling in the 
Stability Pact can serve as a blunt coordination device to the extent that 
undisciplined fiscal policy in any member state country has negative effects on 
partner countries’ economic variables, by crowding out investment or net 
exports, by undermining the stability of the common financial system or the 
credibility of the common monetary policy. In the words of Alberto Giovannini 
(1994, p.190) the role of the fiscal criteria is to “prevent countries from trying to 
exploit monetary union to export their domestic fiscal problems”, as a second 
best safeguard against free-riding in the absence of a set of rules on financial 
relations (as common in federal states).
Consider the pay-off matrix depicted in Figure 1 for a simple illustration of the 
coordination problem, where two countries can choose between tight and lax 
fiscal policy, with both preferring to free-ride on the other country’s fiscal 
discipline. Arbitrary payoffs are chosen for illustration, but most of the above 




























































































underpin Figure 1. Here lax fiscal policies reduce the other country’s utility by 
two payoff units. All else equal, governments prefer lax policies, i.e. 
implementing discipline carries economic and political costs (one payoff unit). 
Fiscal discipline has public good features for both countries but its provision is 
costly. Conversely, each country would like to reap the benefits of fiscal 
expansion (higher output and employment) for itself, while its negative effects 
via higher interest rates, the crowding out of investment or exports and the risk 
of financial instability are shared throughout the union.




tight policy lax policy
tight policy 1, 1 -1,2
lax policy 2,-1 0,0
Countries get stuck in the inefficient Nash equilibrium (bottom-right), where 
both pursue lax budget policies. The Pareto-superior cooperative solution (top- 
left) is not sustainable, because each country has an incentive to deviate, given 
that the other country provides fiscal discipline. The same payoff structure can 
be used to illustrate the domestic deficit bias of the previous subsection. In that 
case the players are different economic interest groups who are interested in 
overall budget consolidation but try to avoid that cuts hit their own clientele. 
Dynamic versions of debt or deficit reduction games can be modelled as “wars 
of attrition”, where each side holds out in the hope that the other side gives in 
and contributes first to the public good (Bliss and Nalebuff 1984, Alesina and 
Drazen 1991). In this perspective the Maastricht criteria appear as a 
commitment device for coordinated fiscal adjustment (Allsopp and Vines 1996).
c) Fiscal Stabilization
Whatever the rationale for the Maastricht criteria and the Stability Pact there is 
a potential price to be paid for satisfying their rigid numerical limits. This price 
comes in the form of lost flexibility in the use of active fiscal policy or in the 
operation of the built-in automatic stabilizers of national budgets and has been 
the major source of criticism of the fiscal criteria. There are two main questions 
with respect to European Monetary Union, first, on the need for a federal 




























































































for the functioning of national stabilization. Two aspects of stabilization can be 
distinguished conceptually, intra-union stabilization in response to asymmetric 
shocks and pan-European responses to common shock components.
The debate over fiscal federalism examines the question where stabilization 
mechanisms should be located, i.e. whether at the European or at the national 
level (e.g. Melitz and Vori 1992, von Hagen and Hammond 1995). It is obvious 
that a European wide stabilization scheme is superior in principle since it 
provides insurance across countries at any point in time, whereas national 
stabilization has to rely on debt build-up (and concomitant negative side effects) 
for consumption smoothing over time. If there are significant Ricardian effects, 
fiscal stabilization may be less powerful to the extent that consumption is 
reduced in the expectation of a higher future tax burden (Bayoumi and Masson 
1996). However, empirically Ricardian effects are likely to be small, especially 
if deficits are perceived to be strictly temporary. The issue then hinges on the 
question to what extent capital market imperfections impede private agents and 
national governments from lending and borrowing in order to achieve 
consumption-smoothing over time (Gros 1996). Again, integrated financial 
markets and EMU should make access to credit easier for governments (e.g. the 
balance of payments constraint is removed) and thus facilitate national 
stabilization policies.
However, a European-wide scheme could be attractive for another reason since 
it may be able to stabilize intra-union shocks automatically and in a way that 
leaves the aggregate fiscal stance unaltered. In this way an unbalanced policy 
mix from uncoordinated national fiscal policies could be avoided. 
Unfortunately, there are serious design problems in a centralized insurance 
scheme which relate to the difficulty of separating out temporary and permanent 
shocks (and therefore insurance from redistribution issues) and to problems of 
moral hazard. In any case, unlike in the discussions of monetary union in the 
1970s, namely the Werner and McDougall reports, the Maastricht construction 
does not call for an expansion of the central European budget nor the 
installation of a European wide fiscal co-insurance mechanism.
Empirical research on fiscal federalism has looked at the experience of federal 
states such as the US, where the federal budget does perform a sizeable 
stabilization function in the order of 20% of income shocks in most of the more 
recent studies (e.g. Bayoumi and Masson 1995). This does not necessarily imply 
that the same stabilization function could not be performed equally effectively 
at the state level. In the US state budget policies are both less important for 
stabilization and more severely constrained (in the choice of tax instruments and 




























































































Moreover, the size of the state sector and the volume of welfare and 
unemployment benefits is generally much greater in Europe and therefore 
national automatic stabilizers should be more powerful (Allsopp and Vines 
1996). Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1995) have estimated the elasticity of the 
central government revenue/GDP ratio with respect to output in the order of 
0.3-0.5 for a number of European countries, as a measure of the fraction of 
changes in disposable income that is offset by changes in government revenues. 
Buti et al. (1997) find that the cyclical sensitivity of the budget balance for 
Europe as a whole is around 0.5% (increase in the deficit in response to a 
deterioration of the output gap of 1%).
The second issue, therefore, is to examine how well equipped national fiscal 
policy would be to perform stabilization within monetary union. There are 
really two questions concerning how necessary and how effective national fiscal 
stabilization will be in EMU. The first point, addressed by the empirical OCA 
literature (see Bayoumi and Eichengreen 1996) regards the incidence of 
asymmetric shocks. These could well be less important compared to the US, 
given that European economies appear to be more diversified than US regional 
economies. Moreover, compared to historical data, the part of asymmetric 
shocks that is due to or amplified by divergent policy responses should be much 
reduced in EMU. On the other hand, OCA theory stresses the importance of 
fiscal policy when national monetary and exchange rate policy are forsaken in 
EMU and as long as prices/wages are rigid and labour mobility remains low.
The effectiveness of national fiscal policy has already been discussed. Again, in 
a simple Mundell-Flemming world fixed exchange rates make fiscal 
interventions more powerful, where the presence of cross-border leakages (even 
though of ambiguous sign) could provide a case for policy coordination. The 
main concern from the stabilization and OCA perspective is that the Stability 
Pact could hamper the operation of automatic stabilizers at the national level, 
just when they are most needed. In particular the fear is that in a recession 
countries will be induced to undertake “perverse” pro-cyclical measures in order 
to avoid hitting the 3% deficit ceiling. The main recommendation from this line 
of argument is to formulate any deficit targets in terms of structural deficits or 
“constant-employment budget balance” (Eichengreen 1997) rather than actual 
deficits. The problem with the NAIRU adjusted deficit targets, besides disputes 
about measurement, is that they provide no reassurance at all about the long-run 
sustainability of public finances, unlike the combination of 60% debt and 3% 
deficit targets in the Treaty.
How much of a constraint on fiscal stabilization the Stability Pact turns out to 




























































































on the size of shocks and whether countries will decide to honour the 3% 
ceiling in a recession or not. We will examine the incentive effects of the 
Stability Pact in more detail in section four, where we argue that a rational 
government should be induced to aim for a structural deficit much below 3% in 
order to reduce the ex ante probability of incurring fines under the Stability 
Pact. Thus a constraint on actual deficits in practice may not operate much 
differently from targets for structural deficits, where the size of the “cushion” 
depends on the distribution of shocks, the probability and size of fines and the 
costs of fiscal discipline. Moreover, in the event of large shocks, the Stability 
Pact does foresee the possibility of sanctions being waived, thus combining ex 
ante deterrence with a limited degree of ex post flexibility.
Indeed the Stability Pact calls on countries to keep their structural deficits close 
to balance or in surplus and if “the structural deficit is close to zero ... the 
operation of automatic stabilizers should still be available” (Lamfalussy 1997). 
Over the course of normal business cycle fluctuations the difference between 
actual and structural deficits is unlikely to exceed 3% very frequently. Masson 
(1996) has calculated a standard deviation of ca. 2%, suggesting that aiming for 
1% deficits or below might be sufficient. Eichengreen (1997) reports cases 
where European countries have experienced shifts in their fiscal positions 
exceeding 3%, i.e. implying a violation of the Maastricht ceiling under the 
assumption that countries start out in fiscal balance, for four EU countries in the 
mid-70s, one country in the early 80s and five countries in the early 1990s. This 
inspires reasonable confidence that the Stability Pact need not be unduly 
restrictive in the face of “normal” size business cycles. Buti et al. (1997) 
provide a retrospective application of the Stability Pact assuming starting points 
either of a balanced budget or a 2% deficit for pre-recession years. Since pre­
recession years tend to have a higher-than-average capacity utilization their 
results should make the Stability Pact look more restrictive than it really is, 
provided that its medium term aim of budgets “close to balance or in surplus” is 
taken seriously.
The real question therefore becomes whether the Stability Pact’s target for 
structural deficits is desirable, realistic and credible and what happens in the 
early days of EMU if countries should enter with deficits right up against the 
3% ceiling and even without their economies being in the trough of a recession. 
A common line of defence for the Maastricht fiscal criteria is the argument that 
a substantial reduction in structural deficits and debt is required independently 
of EMU in particular in view of demographic trends in Europe (Masson 1996). 
From this reasoning prudent governments would be well-advised to perhaps 
even aim for budget surpluses on average in the coming decades. In this 




























































































all. Moreover, turning the critics’ argument on its head, fiscal consolidation 
might be necessary precisely in order to regain the room for manoeuvre that 
allows automatic stabilizers to operate effectively. In the pre-EMU situation of 
a number of countries (e.g. Italy with deficits close to 10% of GDP for much of 
the 1980s) market fears of further deterioration in public finances already 
effectively curtailed both the advisability and the effectiveness of letting 
automatic stabilizers operate fully. According to Buti et al. (1997, p. 13) EU 
countries with above average pre-recession debt and deficits actually have 
pursued pro-cyclical policies in the past, reducing structural primary deficits in 
recessions by 1.2% of GDP on average.
Put in this perspective the trade-off between discipline and flexibility 
disappears, at least in the long-run, and the debate really is one about the 
transition period in the run-up to EMU and in the early years of stage three. 
Even here it has been argued that fiscal retrenchment need not always 
compromise output especially if it restores confidence in public finances over 
the longer term (Giavazzi and Pagano 1991, Bertola and Drazen 1991, IMF
1991) , even though the empirical evidence for “anti-Keynesian” effects appears 
to be mixed at best (Cour et al. 1996, Hughes-Hallett and Me Adam 1996). For 
high debt countries EMU-entry by itself should improve the fiscal outlook even 
in the short term via a reduction in the interest burden. The obvious way to 
reduce the risk of the Stability Pact imposing excessive constraints on fiscal 
stabilization in the early years of EMU is, of course, to insist on strict entry 
conditions and large enough safety margins for EMU participants from the start. 
It is important to recall that the Treaty not only establishes numerical reference 
values for the fiscal criteria but emphasizes the need for the sustainability of 
budgetary positions. The same point has been emphasized in the resolution of 
the German parliament from 2.12.1992 stating that compliance with the criteria 
must not only be statistical, but “durable” and “credible” (Deutscher Bundestag
1992) . This could be read as being much like a condition on structural deficits 
which should prevent countries with a high risk of violating the 3% ceiling 
subsequently from joining in the first place.
III. The Stability Pact and Monetary Policy
The considerations reviewed in the previous section may all be relevant for the 
cost-benefit analysis of the Stability Pact but they do not reflect the principal 
motive of the insertion of the fiscal criteria in the Maastricht Treaty, which is to 
facilitate the ECB’s primary task of achieving low and stable inflation. The 
relevant spillovers in this perspective regard the negative effects of 




























































































common monetary policy. As is stated in para. 18 of Annex 1 of the Presidency 
conclusions of the Dublin summit (Ecofin 1996):
“Sound government finances are crucial to preserving stable economic conditions in 
the Member States and in the Community. They lessen the burden on monetary policy 
and contribute to low and stable inflationary expectations such that interest rates can 
be expected to be low.”
The primary task of the Stability Pact is to safeguard the credibility of monetary 
policy both in the long term (by preventing excessive public debt build-up) and 
in the short-run by keeping deficits in check and thereby reducing the risk of 
imbalances in the macroeconomic policy mix. However, the extensive literature 
on the credibility of monetary policy has little to say on the effect of fiscal 
policy on central bank behaviour and the inflation process. It proposes the 
delegation of policy to an independent central bank which is either more 
conservative than the population at large (Rogoff 1985a) or subject to an 
inflation performance contract (Walsh 1995) as a solution to time-inconsistency 
problems of monetary policy in isolation. The first of these solutions, just like 
commitment to fixed rules on monetary growth suggested by Milton Friedman, 
gives rise to a trade-off between credibility and flexibility, i.e. the benefit of 
reduced inflation at the cost of suboptimal stabilization. This is much like the 
trade-off between fiscal rules and stabilization that was explored under the 
assumption of a (political) deficit bias in section two. The optimal contract 
solution, by contrast, appears to make monetary credibility a “free lunch” by 
exactly offsetting the underlying distortion. Again, the equivalent for the 
previous section would be a reform of the political system that induces 
politicians to maximize long-run social welfare.
In terms of policy implications for EMU both of the above “commitment by 
delegation” solutions can be misleading in two main ways. First, as pointed out 
by McCallum (1995) and formalized by Jensen (1997), the commitment itself 
must be made credible. One possible enforcement mechanism suggested by 
Lohmann (1996) can be provided by reputational forces. For example the reason 
why the Bundesbank has been successful is seen to be the reputational backing 
it receives from the inflation-averse German public. The second main 
shortcoming of the credibility literature is that it looks at a single policy area in 
isolation. In practice the credibility of monetary policy depends on the help it 
receives from fiscal and wage policies in particular, as well as public support 
(Eijffmger and De Haan 1996) and a country’s overall “stability culture”. In 
both dimensions, the credibility of commitment and the interdependence of 
policies, even a central bank which is independent de jure may turn out to be 




























































































In both respects there is reason to be concerned about the likely performance of 
the European Central Bank. Its credibility neither has its own stock of history 
and reputation nor is it reputationally anchored or politically legitimized by the 
support of the European public. The only back-up commitment it has can be 
found in Germany’s exit threat in the event of a high inflation EMU that is 
implied in the German supreme court’s Maastricht judgement (Gros 1996). 
Moreover, fiscal policies and wage setting remain decentralized with the 
necessary degree of stability culture not assured and not uniform across Europe. 
In this perspective the Stability Pact appears as a surrogate discipline and 
coordination device in the absence of a common stability culture, public support 
or common institutions to back up the “empty shell” of central bank 
independence. Consider the simple illustration of monetary-fiscal policy 
interaction in Figure 2. Again payoffs are arbitrary and chosen to capture the 
value of fiscal and monetary policy paths to be coordinated in the short run and 
mutually consistent in the long-run. Conversely, if policymakers are on a 
collision course payoffs are much lower. For example a lax fiscal policy 
combined with tight money leads to an unbalanced policy mix, high interest 
rates, currency appreciation and output losses. Note that both sides have an 
incentive to fall in line. Faced with lax fiscal policy monetary authorities will in 
the end be forced to accommodate and, likewise, when facing a tough ECB 
fiscal authorities will “chicken out” and accept discipline.
Figure 2: A Game of Chicken
Fiscal Authorities
tight policy lax policy
tight policy 4,2 -1,-1
lax policy 0,0 1,3
There are two Nash equilibria in the game of Figure 2. The central bank prefers 
the “conservative” equilibrium (top-left) with tight monetary and fiscal policies, 
whereas fiscal authorities prefer the “liberal” outcome (bottom-right) with 
relaxed policies. The payoffs are as in the standard “game of chicken” (except 
here we make the conservative equilibrium the socially more attractive one), 
where players have an incentive to coordinate their actions but differ over the 
preferred outcome and therefore each side would like to precommit in advance. 
Depending on which side gains strategic leadership in this way, we can 
distinguish two regimes, “monetary dominance” and “fiscal dominance” in the 
terminology of Canzoneri and Diba (1996).
The game can be given economic interpretations both with respect to the long- 




























































































policymakers, as discussed in the following subsections. The long-run 
interpretation focuses on the intertemporal government budget constraint and 
the credibility of low inflation and no-bail out promises. The short-run 
interpretation looks at the issue of the appropriate policy mix for 
macroeconomic stabilization. The Maastricht criteria can be seen as an attempt 
to secure pre-commitment to the monetary dominance regime, i.e. select the 
better of the two possible equilibria and in particular to avoid costly conflict 
(leadership battles) between monetary and fiscal policy.
a) Long-run credibility
A first link between fiscal and monetary variables can be established even in a 
simple Barro-Gordon (1983) framework. As stressed by De Grauwe (1996) the 
presence of nominal (long-term) debt undermines the central bank’s anti­
inflation incentives, because of the temptation to inflate away the stock of debt. 
His policy recommendations are either to suspend the voting rights of the 
representatives of high debt countries on the ECB board or to issue short term 
debt. The former solution runs against the spirit of the ECB as being an 
independent and collegiate European institution, the latter has the drawback of 
undermining ECB credibility in the short run, as public finances become more 
vulnerable to variations in short term interest rates.
More generally, monetary and fiscal policy are linked via the intertemporal 
government budget constraint, which says that a stream of expenditures can be 
financed via taxes, issuing bonds or printing money. Here a regime of “fiscal 
dominance” would mean that the government can precommit to a path of net 
deficits and thus ultimately force the central bank to inflate in order to avoid 
insolvency as in the “unpleasant monetarist arithmetic” of Sargent and Wallace 
(1981). Under “monetary dominance” the central bank can commit not to inflate 
(no explicit or implicit bailout) and thus force the government to adjust its path 
of spending and taxes as in the “unpleasant fiscal arithmetic” of Winckler et al. 
(1996).
There are a few papers that have explored the fiscal-monetary policy interaction 
that could be interpreted to underpin a situation as in Figure 2 in more detail. 
Mourmouras and Su (1995) present a differential policygame between the 
central bank and the government in the context of debt stabilization. Under the 
assumption that central bank independence implies the pre-commitment of 
ruling out the inflation tax it will be able to discipline fiscal policy also, i.e. 
ensure monetary dominance in our terminology. Alesina and Tabellini (1987) 
have three players, the central bank, fiscal authorities and wage setters. In the 




























































































welfare-improving, if fiscal and monetary policy are not coordinated. The 
fiscal-monetary interaction in Beetsma and Bovenberg (1995a), as in the 
Alesina-Tabellini paper, centres on the incentive for surprise inflation and 
seigniorage revenues in the presence of distortionary taxation. If the central 
bank lacks the ability to pre-commit, then government financing requirements, 
debt in particular, embody the stock of credibility problems faced by the central 
bank leading to higher inflation. An independent central bank that can credibly 
ignore the government budget constraint can serve as a substitute for the 
Maastricht restrictions. Beetsma and Bovenberg (1995b) also have debt build­
up undermine the credibility of the central bank, which can be seen as a public 
good. Here the solution of an independent conservative central bank will not be 
sufficient in the presence of additional fiscal distortions, say from government 
myopia. In this case debt targets as in the Maastricht criteria are required on top 
of central bank independence.
In the model by Canzoneri and Diba (1996) in a regime of fiscal dominance the 
fiscal authorities do not respect the implications of the intertemporal budget 
constraint, which leads to current inflation irrespective of the central bank’s 
monetary policy. Under monetary dominance fiscal authorities conform to their 
long-run budget constraint and therefore the central bank is undisturbed in 
achieving its inflation target and enjoys “functional independence”. The latter 
regime requires that primary surpluses respond to the level of debt in a 
systematic way. If not, the price level will be determined by the present value 
government budget constraint, “by the dictates of fiscal solvency”, and not by 
the supply and demand for money (Woodford 1995). This can happen even if 
monetary authorities ignore the path of debt completely (e.g. only care about 
inflation) as long as fiscal policymakers do not follow a “Ricardian fiscal policy 
rule” (Woodford 1996), that offsets any change in debt exactly by a 
compensating change in the present value of future government surpluses.
Whether an economy finds itself in a monetary or fiscal dominance regime 
depends on financial markets’ beliefs about whether primary surpluses will 
respond fast enough to rising government debt. A deficit rule, like the one 
endorsed by Maastricht and the Stability Pact, can be shown to ensure this 
responsiveness and thus establish monetary dominance and the “functional” as 
opposed to “legal” independence of the ECB. From this perspective the 
Stability Pact seems right in focusing on deficits rather than debt. However, 
large stocks of debt may reduce the credibility of the deficit rule if the required 
primary surpluses become too large. The debt criterion may still be important 
for this reason and also as a safeguard against manipulations of the deficit 





























































































The picture is complicated in models that introduce fiscal policy coordination 
issues on top of the fiscal-monetary interaction as in Jensen (1996). Using a 
two-country general equilibrium model he finds that fiscal coordination may be 
bad if the common monetary policy lacks credibility with the private sector. 
This mirrors an earlier result by Rogoff (1985b) showing that coordination of a 
subset of players can be counterproductive. In other words, in a second best 
world, removing one distortion in the presence of another may make matters 
worse. If the central bank cannot precommit, fiscal coordination would reduce 
the credibility of the central bank further, supporting the Maastricht choice of 
fiscal constraints rather than full-fledged fiscal coordination, also in line with 
the conclusions of Bryson et al. (1993). Similar results are obtained by Levine 
and Pearlman (1992), who highlight fiscal policy spillovers via the crowding 
out of investment and terms of trade effects. They compare cooperative and 
non-cooperative equilibria under different assumptions on ECB credibility. 
Again, in regimes where the ECB would accommodate public debt build-up, 
fiscal coordination will be counterproductive, unlike the case where the ECB 
can commit to credible inflation targets.
Agell et al. (1996) have a version of the coordination cum commitment story 
with a more Keynesian flavour, i.e. not based on the inflation tax as the link 
between fiscal and monetary policy (which arguably is of scant empirical 
relevance). The government faces an ex ante trade-off between stimulating 
economic activity and containing budget deficits. It may or may not heed the 
intertemporal budget constraint, while for the monetary authorities both 
discretion and commitment via permanently fixed exchange rates (monetary 
union) is considered. Under discretion both inflation and deficits will be high, 
i.e. the situation of a wage-devaluation cycle with debt build-up. Under 
monetary union inflation will be low, but the deficit bias is worsened, which 
provides a case for introducing fiscal constraints when moving to EMU.
In the models discussed usually two regimes could be distinguished, depending 
on the assumption about pre-commitment abilities and corresponding to the two 
equilibria in Figure 2. In what ways can the Stability Pact help the ECB to 
acquire strategic leadership and why isn’t central bank independence enough to 
ensure this? On the face of it, the ECB seems in an extremely strong strategic 
position, enjoying legal independence, an explicit commitment to price stability 
and facing a fiscal player that is fragmented among national governments 
(Masson 1996). However, recall our concerns about central bank independence 
being an empty shell, the experience that even the most independent central 
banks like the Bundesbank occasionally have to fight hard to reassure their 
leadership against the fiscal authorities and that they need to draw on 




























































































landscape may turn out to be a burden not a blessing, since there is no 
coordination device to ensure that aggregate fiscal outcomes are compatible 
with a monetary leadership regime let alone an optimal policy mix either in the 
short or the long run. Furthermore the lack of pan-European legitimacy for the 
ECB and its political isolation from public preferences may weaken not 
strengthen its resistance to political and economic pressures to ease monetary 
policy. The fiscal rules and the Stability Pact try to prevent such pressures from 
building up (Masson 1996).
b) Short-term credibility and policy-mix
Critics of the Stability Pact have argued that “discipline is a long-term issue” 
and that, if anything, restrictions should be placed on the debt stock rather than 
on current deficits (Pisani-Ferry 1996). From the Canzoneri-Diba (1996) 
perspective of the previous subsection, by contrast, what matters is the 
responsiveness of current deficits to a debt build-up and therefore a deficit rule 
would be needed. Discipline becomes a short-term issue because the long-run 
deficit-debt dynamics can affect inflation expectations and current inflation 
directly. However, the stock of debt can also affect the short-term credibility of 
monetary policy by making public finances more vulnerable to variations in 
short-term interest rates.
In addition to the long-run compatibility of fiscal and monetary policy paths as 
reflected in the interaction via the intertemporal government budget constraint, 
the choice of policy-mix also becomes important in short-term macro-economic 
management. Conflicts between fiscal and monetary authorities can be very 
costly, as the episodes of Reagonomics in the early 1980s and in the wake of 
German unification demonstrate. In both cases an expansionary fiscal policy 
collided with tight monetary policy and the real economy paid a high price for 
the re-establishment of the strategic leadership of the monetary authorities. In 
normal times, when monetary leadership is uncontested, it is very helpful in 
coordinating economic agents’ responses to shocks and expectations (especially 
for wage bargaining and financial markets) and in reducing economic 
uncertainty if agents can rely on the central bank to keep inflation low at least 
over the medium term. European countries’ differing responses to the oil price 
shocks in the 1970s neatly illustrate the virtue of monetary dominance with 
respect to fiscal dominance. The long but unbalanced struggle of European 
economies to regain stability over the course of the 1980s also illustrates the 
costs of an unbalanced policy mix (Allsopp and Vines 1996, p. 97), resulting 
from a credibility bias towards monetary policy (perhaps excessively 
constrained by the EMS) but too lax fiscal regimes. The story here applies both 




























































































In the case of EMU the short-run concern over an unbalanced policy-mix 
mainly relates to the fear that undisciplined fiscal policies (in the aggregate) 
will force the ECB to keep short term interest rates higher than desirable in 
order to offset inflationary pressures, this on top of any upward pressure large 
public deficits might exert on real interest rates. More generally if other 
economic players affecting the determinants of inflation (fiscal authorities and 
wage setters in particular) do not play their part the ECB will either be induced 
to accommodate (i.e. accept the fiscal dominance outcome) or impose great real 
economic costs in an attempt to reassert its leadership. The Stability Pact is 
designed as a (blunt) safeguard to limit the extent to which the ECB will be 
confronted with this dilemma. Again the criteria are an (imperfect) substitute for 
explicit or implicit coordination mechanism via common institutions or a shared 
stability culture. They try to limit the risk that the ECB’s independence is tested 
or contested too severely.
The deficit ceiling, to the extent that it is credible, can also perform an 
important coordination function simply by providing information - both to the 
European Central Bank and the markets - on the likely future evolution of fiscal 
policy. However, the Maastricht deficit limit represents an asymmetric 
constraint and therefore is informative for short-term macroeconomic 
management only when countries are close to the ceiling, i.e. generally in 
recessions not in booms. Again, the Maastricht limits are an inperfect substitute 
for full coordination. The main risk with the Stability Pact is that it could 
actually achieve the exact opposite of what it sets out to do, as long as fiscal- 
fiscal and monetary-fiscal coordination remains rudimentary. Tying the fiscal 
authorities’ hands may well turn out to increase rather than decrease the burden 
on monetary policy with respect to stabilization policy. In particular, the macro- 
economic policy-mix may become unbalanced in the opposite direction, if 
unduly tight fiscal policy in a recession forces monetary authorities into a much 
laxer monetary stance.
The Stability Pact attempts to pre-empt any potential leadership battles between 
fiscal and monetary policy in favour of the ECB and to prevent an unbalanced 
policy-mix of a lax fiscal stance and tight money. Here, it is not quite clear how 
the European Council Resolution on Growth and Employment, adopted at 
French insistence in Amsterdam, would play out. It calls for “developing the 
economic pillar” and “enhancing policy coordination” under Articles 102a and 
103 of the Maastricht Treaty (European Council 1997). This could be harmful 
for stability if it undermines the strategic leadership of the ECB, but it could 
also be helpful if policy-coordination serves to provide support for the ECB’s 




























































































The key remaining arena of conflict concerns exchange rate policy, a “grey 
area” where the Maastricht Treaty in Article 109 balances the operational 
independence of the ECB with the right of the European Council to determine 
the euro’s participation in international exchange rate systems (where unanimity 
is required), to formulate general orientations for exchange rate policy and 
conclude international agreements on monetary and exchange rate matters (both 
by qualified majority vote), where ECB and Commission are consulted. In fact, 
the Amsterdam Conclusions of the Presidency (European Council 1997, p.7) 
invite the Council and the Commission, in cooperation with the EMI, to study 
effective ways of implementing all provisions of Article 109”, which could be 
read as an indication that (some) governments are keen to exert direct influence 
over the euro exchange rate policy.
The implications of the Stability Pact, taken by itself, for the euro exchange rate 
can go in two directions. By reducing the risk of conflicts between fiscal and 
monetary policy (in particular a lax fiscal cum tight money policy-mix) it may 
help avoid exchange rate misalignment and overvaluation in particular. On the 
other hand the constraints on fiscal policy and the lack of coordinated 
macroeconomic responses may place additional burden on the euro exchange 
rate to stabilize (common) shocks. This may increase pressures to use exchange 
rates as a discretionary policy instrument or as a check on the ECB’s monetary 
policy. Exchange rate policy is likely to be the decisive testing ground for the de 
facto independence of the ECB and for the degree of de facto coordination 
across macroeconomic policy actors in Europe in the absence of a unified 
“economic government”.
Finally, on top of intra-European problems of policy coordination strategic 
interaction with the rest of the world complicates the picture further. Drawing 
on a three-country Mundell-Fleming model Eichengreen and Ghironi (1997) 
examine the impact of EMU (i.e. intra-European monetary policy coordination) 
and the question of whether intra-European fiscal policy coordination would 
also be desirable given that both monetary and fiscal policies remain 
uncoordinated with the rest of the world. Their (simulation) results depend on 
the output effects of fiscal contraction, which could be negative or positive (in 
the “anti-Keynesian” case). Again the general conclusion emerges that 
coordination between a subset of players or across a subset of policy areas is not 
necessarily welfare improving. This could mean that moves towards 
coordinating intra-European fiscal polices beyond the Stability Pact should be 
resisted; but it could also mean that monetary and/or fiscal policy ought to be 
better coordinated globally, in the G7 context and in particular with Japan and 
the US. By fostering greater symmetry in the global financial and commercial 




























































































IV. The Operation of The Stability Pact
a) The Stability Pact as an Incentive Device
Before looking at the provisions of the Stability Pact in more detail we explore 
how a stylized version with a fixed penalty for breach of the 3% deficit criterion 
would operate. The presentation here draws on the analysis presented in 
Winkler (1997a) in the context of the Maastricht entrance conditions*.
In equation 1 the 3% deficit criterion can be seen to determine p(E), which is 
the probability of avoiding fines under the Stability Pact as an increasing 
function of consolidation effort (E). E only concerns the extra adjustment effort 
induced by the Stability Pact, i.e. neglecting the part of adjustment that 
policymakers would find in their own interest to undertake in the absence of the 
3% constraint. For the fiscal authorities this extra convergence is costly, with 
increasing marginal costs. The higher /), the more (economically and politically) 
painful it is for a government to pursue fiscal rigour or unpopular budget 
reforms in compliance with the fiscal criteria. The (discounted) penalty, i.e. the 
“Tine” imposed by the Stability Pact, is denoted by T. It could include both 
pecuniary as well as political costs of breaching the criteria.
U = p ( E ) T - £ e 1 2 ( 1)
In the absence of uncertainty p(E) will be a two-valued function; it will be equal 
to one if the 3% limit is satisfied and zero if not. In this case a country will 
undertake the required minimum level of fiscal adjustment if the benefit of 
avoiding the fine exceeds the costs of convergence. However, uncertainty in 
relation to the Maastricht conditions arises from two principal sources. First, 
given that a vote in the Council of ministers is required, it is unclear ex ante 
how strictly the fines of the Stability Pact will be applied and whether 
exceptions may be granted. Second, there is forecasting uncertainty concerning 
the economic conditions which affect the success of fiscal adjustment and there 
is instrument uncertainty regarding how the budgetary measures adopted will 
impact on the actual deficit. On both counts uncertainty can be seen to intervene 
between adjustment effort and the actual deficit.
Therefore, more specifically, a fine under the Stability Pact will be avoided if 
fiscal adjustment exceeds some threshold value M, the 3% criterion. In





























































































equation 2 fulfilment F of the deficit criterion depends on adjustment effort E, 
but also on a random term 6. The marginal “productivity” of effort with respect 
to deficit reduction, i.e. its effectiveness, is measured by a. From this we can 
derive an expression for the probability of success p{E) for some distribution 
function /(0 ), in equation 3.
(0 i f  aE  + e < M
F = {\ i f  aE + e > M  (2)
p (E ) = p(0>\i/) = j f ( 9 ) d d  where \p = M -  aE (3)
A country faced with the 3% deficit threshold M and a prospective fine of size T 
maximizes equation 1 with respect to E, which yields the first order condition 
for optimal effort E*.
E*
dp_T_ 




With adjustment costly and reward uncertain, optimal convergence effort will 
not guarantee that a fine can be avoided. The probability of success can be 
obtained by substituting the optimal adjustment effort into equation 3. Optimal 
convergence effort E* is increasing in the size of the fine T, decreasing in ft. A 
higher M (more ambitious deficit target) increases effort for f ’( i//j>0, otherwise 
it reduces effort. The effect of changing a  is negative for f ’( i//)>0, positive 
otherwise. The corresponding equilibrium probability p* is always increasing in 
T and a, decreasing in [3 and M.
A (credible) tightening o f the deficit limit, all else equal, leads to increased 
convergence effort (as long as f ’(\!t)>0), but always a lower probability of 
success. For the designer of the criteria this gives rise to a potential trade-off, if 
he is interested in keeping the probability and frequency of violations of the 
Stability Pact low as well as in fiscal discipline per se. The targets should not be 
overly ambitious if frequent violations would undermine their credibility and 
hence their effectiveness as incentive devices.
The impact of a recession on adjustment incentives can operate through three 
channels in our model. If it makes the deficit target look further away it is 
equivalent to raising M. If recession makes any given level of effort more 
painful (e.g. unpopular or economically costly) it increases (3; if it makes 




























































































in the size of the fine T increases adjustment effort and the probability of 
success. Note that for different countries parameter values will differ. In 
particular the Maastricht numercial targets are the same for all countries, but the 
implied extra discipline that is required varies considerably. The uniformity of 
the numerical criteria for all countries (a “non-discrimination constraint”) 
means that they cannot be designed as a tailor-made incentive device for each 
country.
The above analysis has interpreted the deficit criterion as a simple threshold 
incentive contract. Under uncertainty governments will equate the marginal cost 
of undertaking fiscal adjustment with the marginal benefit of reducing the risk 
of incurring penalties under the Stability Pact. Rational governments optimizing 
ex ante, will aim for a deficit much below the 3% as a “cushion” against 
subsequent unfavourable shocks. This cushion will be even greater in the 
presence of self-fulfilling credibility feedbacks. If countries react to the 
Stability Pact in this way automatic stabilizers need not necessarily be 
compromised as feared by Eichengreen (1997), in particular in view of 
exceptions in the event of unusually large shocks.
In our ex ante interpretation the 3% ceiling on the actual deficit induces 
behaviour not much different from a target on structural deficits. The main 
difference is that countries can choose their target structural deficit for 
themselves, i.e. the optimal size of their “cushion” depending on their own 
preferences. Likewise, the choice of the nature and instruments of fiscal 
adjustment is left to the individual countries. The criticism of the 3% target as 
arbitrary and “one-size-fits-all” (Eichengreen 1997) is therefore only partially 
justified. Moreover, the same criticism would equally apply to the alternative 
suggestions of NAIRU adjusted deficit targets or a centrally imposed reform of 
national budget procedures proposed by von Hagen and Harden (1994). It is 
also difficult to imagine that the latter would be politically feasible, contractible 
and enforceable in an international treaty. Both the alternatives suffer from the 
additional drawback of not giving any assurance at all on the stabilization of the 
deficit-debt dynamics.
The justified concern, however, is that governments, because they behave 
myopically or find it expedient, will not optimize ex ante but wait with deficit 
reduction measures until “the last minute” after the realization of shocks. In the 
extreme, governments would cling close to the 3% ceiling throughout the cycle 
and only adopt ad hoc budget measures whenever the deficit limit was to be 
violated. Such a behaviour would of course be exactly pro-cyclical and 
extremely damaging, but its prospect cannot entirely be discarded in light of the 




























































































incentive structure was very similar, except that the reward for convergence, i.e. 
EMU entry, is perceived to be much greater than the fines of the Stability Pact. 
Why then, even with so much more at stake, did countries wait so long after the 
signing of the Treaty to undertake serious fiscal adjustment and then were 
forced to do so under very unfavourable cyclical conditions? Winkler (1997b) 
points to some possible answers such as the political uncertainty surrounding 
the if and when of the EMU-launch which reduces the expected reward from 
convergence effort. Moreover, the application of the convergence criteria in the 
entry decision, just like the decision on the launch of EMU itself, was uncertain 
and seen to depend on the relative convergence performance not only 
compliance with absolute numbers. Both made it rational for countries to sit and 
wait until late in the game.
The clarification of procedures in the Stability Pact should be helpful in 
addressing some of these problems, but it is entirely possible that countries 
allowed to enter EMU with high structural deficits might indeed respond to 
perverse procyclical incentives initially. This distortion of economic 
stabilization, or alternatively paying the fines, may however be a price well 
worth paying for low-stability entrants, and perhaps even worth tolerating for 
high-stability members, if the Stability Pact succeeds in limiting negative 
spillovers in particular on the common monetary policy, at least in the longer 
term. In the terminology of the previous section, the Stability Pact’s primary 
task is to ensure a regime of monetary dominance, which largely hinges on the 
credibility of medium to longer-term fiscal adjustment paths, not on the precise 
initial conditions.
b) The provisions o f the Stability Pact
The declared purpose of the “Stability and Growth Pact” concluded at the 
Amsterdam Council meeting on 16 June is to provide “both for prevention and 
deterrence” in securing budgetary discipline while “in no way changing the 
requirements for the adoption of the euro” (European Council 1997, Annex 1, II 
and III). The Pact consists of three components, a European Council Resolution 
and two Council Regulations. The Council Regulation on the strenthening of 
the surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and 
coordination of economic policies (building on Article 103 of the Maastricht 
Treaty) requires euro members to annually and publicly present “stability 
programmes”, while non-euro member submit annual “convergence 
programmes” specifying medium-term budgetary objectives. The Council, on 
recommendation of the Commission, gives an opinion on the programmes, 





























































































The European Council Resolution on the Stability and Growth Pact (see
Appendix A) “solemnly invites all parties, namely the Member States, the 
Council and the Commission, to implement the Treaty and the Stability and 
Growth Pact in a strict and timely manner” and “provides firm political 
guidance” (para. IV.), but - unlike the Council regulations - without being 
legally binding. The Council Regulation on speeding up and clarifying the 
implementation of the excessive deficit procedure (see Appendix B) seeks to 
render more precise the definition of an excessive deficit given in Article 
104c(2a) 2nd indent, which allows for breaches of the 3% criterion if they are 
“exceptional”, “temporary” and if the deficit remains “close” to the reference 
value. It also seeks to provide incentives for avoidance of excessive deficits by 
defining the nature of sanctions and the procedures for their imposition.
To evaluate how the Stability Pact would operate in practice, apart from 
potential “pedagogic effects” from the provisions on early warning and 
multilateral surveillance, the important elements are the size and the timing of 
the envisaged sanctions, the circumstances under which exceptions are granted 
and the degree of discretion in the application of sanctions. The size of 
sanctions must be of an order that serves as an effective ex ante deterrent but 
without being so severe as to render the control of public finances too difficult 
ex post, if sanctions are indeed imposed. The trick is to maximize deterrence 
while minimizing the damage when sanctions are actually imposed. For the 
latter reason an upper limit of 0.5% of GDP on the total annual fine has been 
introduced and the nature of sanctions changes over time. The main way to 
reduce the damaging effects of sanctions actually imposed is due to the time 
that elapses until their become due.
Five components can be distinguished counting from the date (March 1) when 
national deficit data are transmitted to the Commission. First, the decision time 
for the Council upon recommendation from the Commission amounts to three 
months. Then the Member State has four months to react to Council 
recommendations by announcing corrective action, which, second, leads the 
excessive deficit procedure to be held “in abeyance”. Third, if and when the 
procedure is resumed, a further three months can elapse until sanctions are 
imposed. In the case of defiance of Council recommendations from the start (i.e. 
without intermittent abeyance) sanctions must be imposed within 10 months 
(i.e. within the same calendar year, counted from March 1). Fourth, “unless 
there are special circumstances” the Member State is expected to have corrected 
the excessive deficit in the year following its identification. Therefore in cases 
where countries pay “lip-service” to Council recommendation but the measures 
taken turn out to have been ineffective, a full two years will have passed until 




























































































sanctions are decided. Fifth, an additional two years pass before a non-interest 
bearing deposit “should be” transformed into a fine.
The lengthiness of the procedure, in particular the likelihood that the Member 
State will hold up the procedure by announcing corrective action which will 
take time to monitor, should allow countries to avoid pro-cyclical actions and 
sit-out normal recessions without even incurring the non-interest bearing 
deposit. The financial impact of the latter should be negligible, while the 
transformation into a fine takes up to almost three years in the case of a Member 
State defiant from the start (i.e. not even announcing that it will heed Council 
advice), i.e. 10 months plus two years. If the procedure is held in abeyance only 
once, 2 1/4 years will usually pass until a deposit becomes due, 4 1/4 years for a 
fine, always counting from when data first become available. Thus unless a 
recession is extraordinarily persistent (which would likely lead to exemptions 
anyway) the effect of the fine, or even of corrective action to avoid a fine, need 
not be pro-cyclical, except where measures or a fine happen to hit in the next 
recession following the one responsible for the original excessive deficit!
Under the assumption that most countries would choose to announce corrective 
action and that the Council is unlikely to impose sanctions until there is hard 
evidence that the adopted measures have failed, to avoid a deposit (fine) it is 
technically sufficient to bring the deficit ratio below 3% once every three (five) 
years. Moreover only the most recent of the three (five) consecutive deficit 
years becomes relevant for the calculation of the deposit (fine), which may 
create incentives to front-load deficits. Any such behaviour, while not ruled out 
legally, would destroy the credibility of the 3% ratio as an absolute ceiling and 
of the medium-term target of budgets in “surplus or close to balance”, together 
with the credibility of government announcements, stability programmes and 
surveillance procedures.
The second set of issues, besides the size and timing of sanctions, regards the 
exceptions granted and the degree of discretion. The first thing to note is that 
the Stability Pact only gives tighter definitions of the “exceptional” and 
“temporary” escape clauses of Article 104c(2a) but is not any clearer on what is 
to be meant by “close to the reference value”. In case of exceptionally severe 
recessions exceeding a 2% annual output loss, sanctions will be waived. 
According to Eichengreen (1997), who considers output declines over four 
quarters, such deep recessions have only occurred thirteen times over the last 30 
years in the 15 EU countries. Moreover the Stability Pact has opened a window 
of discretion for recessions falling in between 0.75% and 2%, which are much 
more frequent, and for which special circumstances can be pleaded. It is not 




























































































data (as for the deficit figures) or to 12-month comparisons of quarterly data 
throughout the year. Only in the latter case would recessions be treated the same 
independently of when they occur, but then the problem would arise of how to 
match them with the deficit data. Considering annual changes Buti et al. (1997) 
have counted 7 cases (5 distinct episodes) of real GDP declines exceeding 2% 
in the 1961-1996 period for all 15 EU countries, and 30 cases (25 separate 
episodes) in the case of the 0.75% limit.
Note that the 2% reference value is included in the Council regulation and has 
therefore stronger legal status, whereas the 0.75% rule is based on self­
commitment by the Member States. Both values are applied “as a rule”, i.e. are 
not strictly automatic, and they do not supercede the possibility under Article 
104c (3) and (6) that other factors will be taken into account in the decision on 
whether a deficit is excessive. Inside the corridor of discretion, for output losses 
between 0.75% and 2%, two additional decision criteria are mentioned 
explicitly, “the abruptness of the downturn” and “the cumulated output loss 
relative to past trends”.
Where there is room for interpretation the voting dynamics of the Ecofin 
Council become decisive. The imposition of sanctions requires a qualified 
majority where the country in question is excluded together with euro-outsiders. 
However, the prior decision on whether an excessive deficit exists according to 
Article 104c (6) of the Maastricht Treaty is voted by qualified majority by all 
Member States under Article 148 (2), i.e. including the country under 
examination and even including euro-outsiders. This means that a blocking 
minority of 26 votes (for example Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece have 28 
votes) could prevent the excessive deficit procedure getting off the ground in 
the first place, even if there should be a qualified majority of insiders in favour 
of the imposition of sanctions.
The original Maastricht Treaty “excessive deficit procedure” has an asymmetry 
in requiring a qualified majority both for the imposition of a verdict of an 
“excessive deficit” as well as for abrogating the verdict according to Article 
104c (12), as pointed out by Gros (1996). The same asymmetry holds for the 
imposition of sanctions but not for the decision to hold the procedure in 
abeyance. In order to proceed with the excessive deficit procedure a qualified 
majority must find that the Member State in question has failed to comply with 
Council recommendations according to Article 104c (8), (9) and (11). The way 
the voting requirement goes can of course make a big difference to the “bite” of 
the Stability Pact, not only in the “corridor of discretion”. The asymmetry in 
decision making means that it is very difficult to initiate and proceed with the 




























































































obtain. By contrast it is more difficult to lift sanctions, once imposed, and to 
terminate the procedure altogether. For the decision on sanctions (voted only by 
euro-insiders, excluded the country under examination) the size of the monetary 
union matters. Eichengreen (1997) suspects that the application of the Stability 
Pact will be more rigid in a large EMU as a counterweight to the perceived 
greater (inflation) pressures on the ECB. On the other hand the presence of 
fiscally less disciplined countries should affect the voting behaviour of Ecofin 
in the opposite direction.
In fact a vote on the imposition of sanctions is required even outside the 
“corridor of discretion” and the question therefore is, how serious is the 
declaration of intent, the “solemn invitation” to the strict and timely application 
of the Stability Pact? How binding is the implied pre-commitment of future 
voting behaviour embodied in the Stability Pact? How will it be enforced if it 
comes to the crunch? According to Article 104c(10) of the Maastricht Treaty 
violations of the fiscal provisions in Article 104c(l-9) cannot be brought before 
the European Court of Justice and this is not changed by the Stability Pact 
What would happen if the the majority of the Council chose to ignore the 
Stability Pact in practice or if a Member State refused to pay the fines?
Moreover, even the formulation of the text is far from the automaticity 
originally demanded by the German side; the numerical values and sanctions 
will only be applied “as a rule”. Given the amount of discretion that is retained 
it must also be asked how likely it is that finance ministers will impose 
sanctions on colleagues, possibly knowing that they themselves may well soon 
end up in the same situation. Put more provocatively, can the self-enforcement 
of fiscal virtue be entrusted to a club of notorious (or at least potential) sinners? 
In particular, voting behaviour is likely to reflect not only the absolute 3% 
reference value but the relative budgetary positions of partner countries (and 
their probabilities of also breaching the deficit ceiling). A relative performance 
application of the Stability Pact would be desirable if the fact that many 
countries are in difficulties is due to a common adverse shock and not a sign of 
a generalized lack of discipline. The drawback is the opportunity for countries 
to collude in order to escape the discipline of the 3% ceiling.
In all this, it should not escape notice that financial penalties may be exacted by 
the bond market even if they are not enforced by the Pact; and these penalties 
may easily be much larger than those that even a keen observer of the Pact 





























































































On closer inspection the Stability and Growth Pact seems to have much less 
“bite” than has been commonly thought (or feared), to judge by many 
economists’ reactions to it. This has partly to do with its legal structure, in 
particular its heavy reliance on declared self-commitment, and partly with the 
room for discretion retained in the wording of the provisions and with the time 
profile of sanctions and decision procedures. Much like central bank 
independence, the Stability Pact appears to be an “empty shell”, which does not 
mean that it is necessarily ineffective. The framework and procedures that are 
created together with the numerical benchmarks may well by themselves 
influence incentives in the desired direction, but “soft” factors like peer pressure 
and the degree of shared “stability culture” are likely to be at least as important 
as the legal force and details of the Pact’s provisions.
The focus on the numerical values of the Maastricht fiscal criteria and in the 
Stability Pact, even more pronounced in the public debate than in the actual 
wording of the provisions, runs the risk of diverting attention to ways of 
fiddling with the numbers, of taking token measures and manipulating budget 
forecasts. Yet, some such measure of actual performance had to be chosen, 
however imperfect, in order to provide incentives for discipline. Moreover, the 
reference values have to be seen together with the emphasis both in the Treaty 
and the Stability Pact on the sustainability of medium-term budget policies. As 
argued by Masson (1996), the Maastricht criteria may be sensible, but the 
measures taken to fulfil them are not. Even if an increased emphasis on 
structural reforms, including those of national budget procedures themselves 
(von Hagen and Harden 1994), is called for, this does not obviate the need for 
providing a numerical target for the outcomes of any such reforms.
In principle there need neither be a contradiction between the 3% numerical 
target and longer-run reforms and sustainability, nor between discipline 
(credibility) and stabilization (flexibility). If the Stability Pact operates as an 
effective (ex-ante) incentive device, countries should be induced to keep a 
safety margin that would allow automatic stabilizers to deal with normal size 
shocks without breach of the 3% ceiling. Moreover, the degree of flexibility and 
the procedures of the Stability Pact make it quite possible that countries can get 
by with repeated violations of the numerical target without incurring any 
sanctions. This could be welcomed for the increased ex post flexibility, but it 
undermines the ex ante deterrence of the Stability Pact. The problem here is that 
there is an ambitious, declared numerical norm (the 3% deficit ceiling 
throughout a normal economic cycle), while sanctions for violations of this 




























































































there is room for a potential conflict between those who might come to view 
sanction-free behaviour as an acceptable standard, leaning towards a state- 
contingent reading of the 3% rule, and between those defending the 3% rule at 
face value. A further negative side-effect of the Stability Pact could be that 
planned and actual deficits will diverge even more than at present, especially 
with respect to medium-term projections, since holding up the excessive deficit 
procedure (and thus avoiding sanctions for past deficits) hinges so much on 
announced government policies.
Trade-offs between discipline and stabilization are likely to arise in the early 
phase of EMU if countries join stage three with deficits right up against the 3% 
ceiling. The provisions of the Stability Pact would then face an early test just at 
the same time when the new ECB will be keen to establish its reputation. The 
seriousness of the problem (the strain on the ECB and the Stability Pact) will 
depend on the cyclical position of the European economies and on how strictly 
the Maastricht entry criteria will be applied. Therefore the scope for a trade-off 
between the Stability Pact and the entry criteria appears to be limited. On the 
one hand the Stability Pact should give reassurance on the longer-run stability 
orientation of EMU and therefore could allow a more relaxed attitude to the 
entry-conditions and a larger initial memberhip (Artis 1996). However, in the 
short-run, if cyclical conditions and budget figures remain weak, the Stability 
Pact could prove counterproductive by either inducing pro-cyclical behaviour or 
by being shown as ineffective (if overshoots of the 3% are allowed) right from 
the start. Even more caution in the application of the entry criteria is required to 
the extent that pre-EMU consolidation success was the product of one-off 
measures or a shifting of revenues and expenditures over time.
While there is some reason to doubt the effectiveness of the technical provisions 
of the Stability Pact in guaranteeing the desired discipline and flexibility in 
practice, the mere fact that Member States have agreed to subject national 
budget policies to a concerted European joint discipline is of great significance 
on two counts. First, by regarding fiscal policy effectively as of common 
concern the chances are increased that for the various coordination problems 
that were identified, namely fiscal-fiscal, monetary-fiscal and the policy-mix 
with respect to the rest of the world, over time “positive” solutions can be 
found, moving beyond the “negative”, sanction- and constraint-based approach 
of the Stability Pact. A first step in this direction could be the Amsterdam 
Resolution on Employment and Growth with its emphasis on the coordination 
of economic policies. This is likely to be a slow and painful learning process 
and we have pointed to exchange rate policy as a likely arena of conflict. 
Conceding concerted fiscal discipline in order to safeguard the leadership and 




























































































explicit coordination. It also serves as an important signal to the financial 
markets of Europe’s credibility credentials that may help build stability 
reputation ahead of the leap into EMU (Masson 1996).
Second, the conclusion of the Stability Pact also represents a small, but 
important, transfer of national sovereignty in the budgetary field. Unlike Gros 
(1996) and Thygesen (1996) we believe that there is a nexus between Political 
Union and Monetary Union. In the final analysis EMU will only be successful if 
all the main policy actors are sufficiently ready to subordinate national or 
special interests for the common good and the stability of the common currency 
and if the ECB enjoys public support across Europe - or at least a sufficient 
degree of legitimacy. Otherwise, monetary stability and political cohesion in 
Europe may yet become lost in the “Bermuda triangle” between national and 






























































































Key p ro v isio n s o f th e  E u ro p e a n  C ounc il R eso lu tion  on  th e  S tab ility  a n d  G ro w th  P ac t
M em b er S ta tes
1. commit themselves to respect the medium-term budgetary position of close to b a lan ce  o r  
in  su rp lu s  set out in their stability or convergence programmes [...];
5. will correct excessive deficits as quickly as possible after their emergence; this co rrec tio n  
should be co m p le ted  in  th e  y e a r  fo llow ing  its id en tifica tio n , unless there are special 
circumstances;
7. commit themselves not to invoke the benefit of Article 2 paragraph 3 of the Council 
Regulation on speeding up and clarifying the excessive deficit procedure unless they are in 
severe  recession ; in evaluating whether the economic downturn is severe, the Member States 
will, as a rule, take as a reference point an a n n u a l fall in  re a l G D P  o f  a t  lea s t 0 .75% .
The C om m ission
3. commits itself to p re p a re  a  r e p o r t  under Article 104c(3) whenever there is the risk of an 
excessive deficit or w h en ev e r the planned or actual government d efic it exceedsthe 3%  of 
GDP reference value, thereby triggering the procedure under Article 104c(3);
4. commits itself, in the event that the Commission considers that a deficit exceeding 3% is 
not excessive and this opinion differs from that of the Economic and Financial Committee, to 
p re se n t in writing to the Council the re aso n s  fo r  its  position;
5. commits itself, following a re q u e s t f ro m  th e  C ouncil under Article 109d, to  m ak e , as a 
rule, a  re co m m e n d a tio n  for a Council decision on whether an excessive deficit exists under 
Article 104c(6);
The C ou n cil
3. is in v ited  to  im pose  san c tio n s  if a participating Member State fails to take the necessary 
steps to bring the excessive deficit situation to an end as recommended by the Council;
4. is urged to always require a n o n -in te re s t b e a rin g  deposit, whenever the Council decides to 
impose sanctions on a participating Member State in accordance with Article 104c( 11);
5. is urged always to c o n v ert a deposit in to  a  fine  a f te r  tw o  y e a rs  [....], unless the excessive 




























































































A P P E N D IX  B
Key A rtic les  o f  th e  C ounc il R eg u la tio n  on speed ing  u p  an d  c la rify in g  the 
im p le m e n ta tio n  o f  th e  excessive defic it p ro c e d u re
A rtic le  2
1. The excess of a government deficit over the 3% reference value shall be considered 
ex cep tio n a l and te m p o ra ry  [...] when resulting from an u n u su a l ev en t outside the control of 
the Member State concerned and which has a major impact on the financial position of the 
general government, or when resulting from a severe  econom ic d o w n tu rn . In addition, the 
excess over the reference value shall be considered temporary if budgetary forecasts as 
provided by the Commission indicate that the deficit will fall below the reference value 
following the end of the unusual event or the severe economic downturn.
2. The Commission when preparing a report under Article 104c(3) shall, as a rule, consider an 
excess over the reference value resulting from an economic downturn to be excep tiona l only 
if there is an annual fa ll o f  re a l G D P  o f  a t  lea s t 2 % ” .
3. The Council when deciding, according to Article 104c (6), whether an excessive deficit 
exists, shall in its o v e ra ll a ssessm en t take into account any observations made by the Member 
State showing that an annual fall of real GDP of less than 2% is nevertheless exceptional in 
the light of further supporting evidence, in particular on the a b ru p tn e s s  o f  th e  d o w n tu rn  or 
on the a cc u m u la te d  loss o f  o u tp u t relative to past trends.
A rtic le  3
3. The Council shall d ec id e  on the existence of an excessive deficit [...] w ith in  th re e  m on ths 
of the reporting dates [...].
4. The Council recommendation [....] shall establish a d e ad lin e  o f  fo u r  m o n th s  at the most 
for effective action to be taken by the Member State concerned. The Council recommendation 
shall also establish a deadline for the c o rre c tio n  o f  th e  excessive deficit, which should be 
completed in  th e  y e a r  fo llow ing its  id en tifica tio n  unless there are special circumstances.
A rtic le  4
2. The Council, when considering whether effective action has been taken [...], shall base its 
decision on p u b lic ly -an n o u n c ed  decisions by the Government of the Member State 
concerned.
A rtic le  5
Any Council decision to give no tice  to the participating Member State concerned to take 
measures for the deficit reduction in accordance with Article 104c(9) shall be taken w ith in  
one  m o n th  of the Council decision having established that no effective action has been taken 




























































































A rtic le  6
Where the conditions to apply Article I04c(l 1) are met, the Council shall im pose  san c tio n s 
in accordance with Article 104c(ll). Any such decision shall be taken no  la te r  th a n  tw o 
m o n th s  a f te r  the Council decision giving notice [...].
A rtic le  7
If a participating Member State fails to act in compliance with the successive decisions of the 
Council [...], the decision of the Council to impose sanc tions, [...], shall be taken w ith in  ten 
m o n th s of the reporting dates [...]. An expedited procedure will be used in the case of a 
deliberately planned deficit which the Council decides is excessive.
A rtic le  9
1. The excessive deficit procedure shall be held in abeyance :
- if a Member State concerned acts in com pliance  w ith  re co m m e n d a tio n s  made in 
accordance with Article 104c(7),
- if a Member State concerned acts in com pliance  w ith  no tices given in accordance with 
Article 104c(9).
A rtic le  11
Whenever the Council decides to apply sanctions to a participating Member State in 
accordance with Article 104c(l 1), a n o n -in te re s t b e a rin g  d ep o sit shall, as a rule, be required. 
[ - ]
A rtic le  12
1. When the excessive deficit results from non-compliance with the criterion relating to the 
government deficit ratio in Article 104c(2a), the amount of the first deposit shall comprise a 
fixed  co m p o n e n t equal to 0.2% of GDP, and a v a ria b le  co m p o n e n t equal to one tenth of the 
difference between the deficit as a percentage of GDP in  th e  p receed in g  y e a r  and the 3% of 
GDP reference value.
2. Each following year, [...]. The amount of an additional deposit shall be equal to one tenth of 
the difference between the deficit as a percentage of GDP in  th e  p re ce ed in g  y e a r  and the 3% 
of GDP reference value.
3. Any single deposit [...] shall not exceed the u p p e r  lim it o f  0 .5%  o f  G D P.
A rtic le  13
A deposit shall, as a rule, be co n v erted  [...] in to  a  fine  if two years after the decision to 
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